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Abstract: Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal
consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with
behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms.
Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism
of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures
necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that
his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“aconscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to
cognitive processing. This criticism calls into question his inference from certain cognitive states
to the presence of p-consciousness, and may have significant implications for the moral standing
of fishes and their treatment in fish welfare policy, since p-consciousness, but not a-consciousness
alone, is typically thought to ground moral standing. I conclude that this criticism does not raise a
decisive objection to Woodruff’s argument, or to its usefulness for ethics and policy.
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The cortex: Searching for homology in all the wrong places
According to Woodruff (2017), although fish lack the cortical structures associated with
mammalian phenomenal consciousness (p-consciousness), regions of the teleost fish pallium and
optic tectum can accommodate many of the functions associated with consciousness in
mammals. For instance, the optic tectum contributes to such functions as sensory integration
and binding, selective attention, and the segregation of the sensory modalities, while regions of
the pallium may contribute to (inter alia) regulating motivational and affective states. These
neuronal connections and anatomy are, he argues, “complex enough to support the reentrant
computational processes proposed to underlie sentience in mammals.” In addition to these
structural features of the teleost tectum, the pallium contains similar types of neurophysiological
features, such as EEG signatures and neurotransmitter systems, suggesting that affective and
motivational states modulate behavioral response in fishes in much the way they do in mammals.
Woodruff concludes that this neurobiological data, combined with behavioral data suggestive of
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consciousness, provides strong evidence against the view that a cortex or homologous structure
is required for consciousness, and for the presence of p-consciousness in teleost fishes.
While I leave it to others to assess the merits of Woodruff’s specific neurobiological
claims, I believe that he gives more weight to the objection that fishes cannot be conscious
because consciousness requires either a cortex or a homologous structure (which fish lack), than
this objection deserves. Not only does this claim (a) beg the question against the potential
multiple realizability of consciousness (Jones 2016), but also, by requiring homology at the level
of gross morphology, it (b) takes a simplistic approach to homology in cognition and its underlying
substrates and (c) neglects the possibility that consciousness arose numerous times
independently in the vertebrate clade (Allen 2013). There is no reason to assume a priori that
consciousness can only be realized in mammals (let alone animals in general) by the specific
structures that give rise to it in humans; there are many a posteriori (empirical) reasons to reject
the cortex-centered view of consciousness (Karten 2015).
Evidence that consciousness can be realized by noncortical structures of the brain comes
from the behavioral and neurobiological study of birds, such as corvids (crows, ravens, jays) and
psittacines (parrots). These animals are well-known for their flexible behavioral repertoires and
cognitive sophistication, despite lacking a recognizable structure that is homologous with the
mammalian cortex. Until relatively recently, their behavioral flexibility had been explained away
as arising from simple cognitive mechanisms because their brains were thought to be incapable
of sustaining complex cognition. As behavioral evidence mounted, however, neuroscientists
began to search for structures in the avian brain that could do the work of the mammalian cortex
— in effect, for a “functional” avian cortex. This search led researchers to the avian
telencephalon, which is not homologous with the mammalian cortex at the level of gross
morphology, but appears to be homologous at lower levels (e.g., microcircuitry, biochemistry,
and cell-type) (Olkowicz et al. 2016). It is plausible that homology at lower levels can underwrite
consciousness in morphologically divergent but functionally similar macroscopic neuroanatomies
in disparate groups.
We cannot, therefore, rule out the possibility that evolution has converged on pconsciousness numerous times, realized by a diversity of structures and neurophysiological
features at both the level of gross morphology and at the lower levels. Indeed, recent
developments in invertebrate neurobiology point in the direction of remarkable neurobiological
diversity underpinning consciousness across the animal kingdom. There is mounting behavioral
evidence of complex cognition and perhaps consciousness in cephalopod mollusks such as the
octopus and cuttlefish, insects such as bumblebees, and arachnids such as jumping spiders
(Edelman & Seth 2009; Barron & Klein 2016). For instance, Klein & Barron (2016) maintain that
insect brains are functional analogues of regions of vertebrate brains that they take to support
experiential (phenomenal) consciousness.1
If fish, cephalopods, and some insects are indeed p-conscious, then basic forms of
consciousness may be evolutionarily ancient, extending as far back in time as the Cambrian. This
view is supported by the hypothesis that consciousness emerged as an adaptive response to the
1

“While there is no obvious similarity in the gross anatomy … there is an overall similarity in functional
architecture between the vertebrate midbrain [which K & B take to support p-consciousness in vertebrates] and
the insect brain as a whole” (Klein & Barron 2016, p. 5).
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information-processing challenges of active lifestyles, such as the need to transform dynamic
multisensory perceptual inputs into a coherent and temporally stable scene as distinct from the
organism’s own movements (the “re-afference problem”) and to coordinate and control complex
bodies; and to identify relevant environmental cues. All of these may contribute to the “effective
decision-making” needed for adaptive action (Mikhalevich, Powell, & Logan 2017; Powell in
prep.). These problems are efficiently addressed by perceptual and cognitive abilities typically
correlated with consciousness, such as sensory binding and directed attention. 2 Whether
consciousness emerged multiple times in evolutionary history, or whether it evolved once long
ago, the lesson for the cortex-centered view is the same: consciousness is unlikely to be unique
to mammals or to require mammalian neural correlates of consciousness. As Braithwaite &
Droege (2016) write, “the question is not whether fish have a cortex or an insula, but whether
they have the functional capacity for [indicators of consciousness such as] global integration and
attentional amplification.”
P-consciousness, a-consciousness, and moral standing
A more serious objection to Woodruff’s analysis is that even if he has successfully established
that fish behavior and neurobiology indicate a capacity for global integration and sensory binding,
these capacities are only indicative of a-consciousness and not p-consciousness.3 Call this the “awithout-p” objection. 4 The separability of a-consciousness and p-consciousness is difficult to
deny as a matter of conceptual possibility. The question is whether we have reason to think that
these different sorts of consciousness come apart in the actual world.
If the a-without-p objection holds, then Woodruff’s account may be of limited ethical
import because not all forms of consciousness matter morally. The distinction between access
and p-consciousness has important implications for the class of beings who are recognized as
having “moral standing,” or interests that are valuable for the entity's own sake. Forms of
consciousness that matter morally are those that give rise to interests, which in turn ground
rights and corresponding obligations toward the interest-bearers (Kahane & Savulescu 2009). For
example, beings for whom pains, joys, and the satisfactions of desires feel like something have
interests vis-à-vis those pains, joys, and satisfactions. These “experiential” interests associated
2

“For active animals with well-developed spatial senses, it is computationally more effective to resolve the reafference problem once in a unified sensory model than to resolve it in a dispersed and peripheral way for each
sense independently” (Klein & Barron 2016, p. 3).
3
Woodruff adopts the view that “mental images are part of primary, sensory consciousness and, therefore,
contribute to “something it is like.” Since fishes have the perceptual systems necessary for mental image
formation, he concludes that they also possess the substrates necessary for p-consciousness. However, it is
possible that mental images may be p-unconscious, such as scenes viewed through the display screen of an
iPhone. While mental images are surely importantly different from images displayed on a cell phone, the point
here is that visual scenes may be transformed into representations without those representations rising to the
level of conscious.
4
The a-without-p objection accepts what the philosopher of cognitive science Chalmers (1995) calls the “hard
problem” of consciousness, or the causal-explanatory gap between the mechanistic properties of the brain as
reflected (e.g.) in a-consciousness, and the experiential quality of p-consciousness. It bears noting, however, that
although Block’s distinction between a-consciousness and p-consciousness has been largely accepted in the
philosophical community since its introduction in 1995, it is not uncontroversial.
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with feeling, wanting, and acting beings are the basis of moral consideration. By contrast, there
is nothing that it is like to be a merely a-conscious animal and, thus, the content of such an
animal’s life cannot matter to the animal. A-conscious beings lacking p-consciousness thus fail to
satisfy a crucial precondition of moral standing (Jaworska & Tannenbaum 2013; Butler & Cotterill
2006). Moreover, while other forms of consciousness (e.g., self-consciousness) or cognition may
generate additional interests for p-conscious beings, p-consciousness seems to be a necessary
condition for moral standing as such.5
Has Woodruff succeeded in showing that fishes are not merely a-conscious, thus
overcoming the a-without-p objection? I suggest that not only is he entitled to the claim that
fishes are likely p-conscious, but that ethicists would be justified in drawing on his analysis in
defending the moral standing of fishes. This is because the objection is predicated on an
unjustified standard of evidence. Much of the animal ethics literature appears implicitly
committed to the idea that certain abilities explicable in exclusively a-conscious terms
nevertheless give rise to moral standing. These include sophisticated cognitive states (e.g.,
mirror-self recognition, tool use, mindreading), affective states (e.g., fear or pain), and perceptual
abilities (e.g., perceptual binding). If some a-conscious states ground moral standing, then either
(i) they are presumed to be attended by p-consciousness; or (ii) they ground moral standing on
their own. A third possibility is that none of these abilities can in principle indicate pconsciousness. This third, deflationary option is frequently taken to be the default or “null”
position, and thus the burden of proof is often placed on hypotheses that presume to show that
a given animal is p-conscious. As a consequence, accounts such as Woodruff’s are required to
demonstrate their explanatory or predictive superiority over the “null.”6
Yet the case for the deflationary view is at best equivocal. The empirical arguments in its
favor draw largely on outlier cases from human lesion studies (e.g., with blindsight patients) and
from examples of subconscious human behavior (e.g., driving without attending to the road), of
which the relevance to intact and attentive animals is contested. Against this, evidence of pconsciousness reliably co-occurring with a-consciousness comes from experimentally controlled
first-person reports combined with neurological signatures. If such reports are valid in the human
case, they ought to be valid in the nonhuman case as well (Edelman & Seth 2009), as thinking
otherwise would be biologically unparsimonious (Butler & Cotterill 2006). It would be a mistake
to stake a case for the burden of proof on such equivocal evidence. Woodruff’s case for pconsciousness in fishes is, therefore, not undermined by the possibility that the behavior and
neurobiology he describes can be explained by reference to a-consciousness alone.
That said, philosophers of mind may find Woodruff’s account of consciousness in fish
unsatisfying, preferring a higher standard of evidence before granting p-consciousness to
animals. However, for both animal cognition scientists with working hypotheses in hand, and for
ethicists who should err on the side of attributing morally relevant properties in the absence of
conclusive evidence, Woodruff’s case for p-consciousness in fish ought to suffice.7

5

Even for the Kantian, p-consciousness appears be a necessary condition for moral standing.
A parallel situation exists in comparative cognition research, wherein the “null” position is frequently that an
animal lacks some cognitive feature (Mikhalevich 2016).
7
Indeed, variations in standards of evidence across disciplines are both expected and arguably justified by the
different epistemic and practical goals of these disciplines (Block 2011).
6
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Ethics as evidence
Finally, it is worth noting an additional, subtler, ethical dimension to the science of consciousness:
the ethical implications of theories of p-consciousness may implicitly bias our estimates of the
plausibility of those theories. Scientists and philosophers alike may find a theory of consciousness
less intuitively plausible if it appears to imply that we have moral obligations toward beings who
have typically been excluded from the moral community. However, if a new theory of
consciousness implies that, for example, molecules or thermostats have moral standing, then
rather than conclude that the attribution of consciousness is problematic because consciousness
has such and such ethical implications, we should conclude that our theory of moral standing is
inadequate. Similarly, some consciousness researchers may question the plausibility of the idea
that fishes or insects are p-conscious because the implication — that we have ethical obligations
toward these organisms — may strike them as absurd. Indeed, the ethical implication may seem
so implausible that it might function as an informal reductio ad absurdum of the claim that there
is something that it’s like to be a cichlid, a jumping spider, or a honeybee. However, while
rejecting a normative theory for its apparently absurd ethical implications may be rational, it is
fallacious to reject a descriptive scientific theory for its normative implications. There may be
good scientific reasons for rejecting a theory of consciousness that is so permissive that even
molecules qualify; but distaste for a proposition does not alter its truth-value. In short, we must
not allow our moral intuitions to prejudice the plausibility estimates of analyses such as
Woodruff’s, even (or especially) when these analyses ascribe consciousness to animals as alien
in morphology and lifeways as fishes and invertebrates.
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